How fast did apollo 13 travel

Before we have to worry about that I guess we got another primary and three secondaries to go through. Albeit the LiOH situation is a concern, they still have plenty of capacity left in the LM system before they are forced to switch over to their self-built backup. Your rates are once again looking good so we can continue on with the rest of this procedure. Request you go ahead with the Verb 76, Enter, and Mode Control, to Att Hold, and then the last step, 30 clicks yaw right.

Mode Control to Att Hold. Now you want me to do 30 clicks of right yaw? We'd like to look at it for just a little while before we power down the PGNS, so stand by. Turning off the platform and the computer saves them 10 amps, essentially halving their power consumption. Request Aft Omni. That did it. Thank you. Ptolemaeus and Alphonsus are two large dominant craters near the centre of the Moon's nearside disk.

The fact that the crew can see them indicates that they are seeing more of the near side. Alphonsus is notable because it has three distinctive dark patches around the edge of the crater floor, thought to be volcanic in origin. Did you put it back?

Was that a midcourse? Then, you got us in the right plane, Jim. We're in the right plane. We're pointed off and we'll swerve on again with the Earth, Moon, and Sun. This is Apollo Control, Houston; at 81 hours, 45 minutes now into the flight. That blasted service - Command Module is back there.

Scratch that one. That one? First, midcourse correction will probably be at GET hours, and all we look for is a 4 to 6 feet per second Delta-V. That's the first item. Now, I will give you a rundown on consumables. In the LM, you have - that is 1 4 9 8 amp-hours remaining. That means over 61 hours you'd - That would average out to We expect that, after powerdown, that you will use 1 4 or 14 amps per hour, and that would leave a reserve of amp-hours at the end of the mission.

Are you with me? Estimated water, oxygen, battery power and LiOH supplies left at this moment. A table produced after the mission shows a listing of the critical LM consumables and their usage during each hour of operation, and the expected time they are to last. These varied according to their present use, of course.

In the LM, you have , that is 2 1 5, pounds of water, usable. That would average out over 61 hours to 3. And after you power down, we expect that you will be using water at the rate of 3. Okay, next, LiOH. And, in the LM, using its cans, you have 44 hours remaining. That's affirm. That includes PLSS secondaries. Water and power usage are intimately tied.

Improving one will improve the other. Less power consumption means less heat will need to be transmitted out of the spacecraft, which requires water. You have remaining 44 pounds in the LM. At a usage rate of 0. Next, RCS. RCS A stands at 6 2 percent and B at 6 2 percent. You have feet per second remaining. We estimate that you have 99 amp-hours. That's an estimate. And that's it. The Command Module battery status is of utmost interest to all of them. Their return to Earth is dependent on how much power they have left for use during reentry.

Oxygen is not a crucial item at the moment. The LM has an ample supply, due to the reserve carried for repressurizing the cabin after two lunar surface EVAs. Since this is not to be done, they have plenty of oxygen to last the return home, three people in the LM or not.

And just a question. It would be interesting to hear from Jack to see if he thinks that Main B bus is good. If he has any idea of how, if whether it's good or not, this would influence our steps in the future; for example, we might want to try to test Main B to see if it is, in fact, good so that we'd know how to set switches for entry. Just a minute. Since the crash of Main Bus B was the first sign of the trouble onboard the ship, they are concerned that this half of the power distribution system might be permanently damaged.

We'd like to give you a procedure for that later on. Got a midcourse at hours, He's going to give us a procedure for that later on. He says you've been working hard, and you ought to relax a little bit and be ready for tomorrow. Let me give you my observations on Main Bus B. Things happened pretty fast there, and we first heard the impact or explosion or whatever caused it, I'm not sure.

I looked at the voltage, and the voltage was good at this time so I'm suspecting it was a spike. Fuel cell 3 was also good, with good flow.

However, Fred, at that point, was coming into the Command Module and got over into his seat. At that time, we shortly had an AC Bus 2 light about the time he got into his seat. It, however, - and the fuel cell flows were zero. I'm kind of suspecting that perhaps we do have a Main - a current Main Bus B.

But that's merely a guess. I never did try to reset it. We were having other problems with the Main Bus A, having an Undervolt and a few other things like that. I'd kind of like to hear what your feelings are down there. This is the first, and only extended description of the accident heard on the air to ground loop. Neither Mission Control nor the crew is eager to dwell. And we'd like to hold off because we're still working the problem.

So we'll have to give you information later. We lost lock there. We switched Omnis. Just for my own - kind of to get my thoughts in order, I'd kind of hear what - I'd like to hear what kind of entry you're planning. PGNCS entry is being planned, and people are at work on checklist changes and that sort of thing. Jack is wondering whether they plan to perform Earth atmospheric reentry under Command Module Computer control, or with the crew manually guiding them with information derived from the EMS display.

We think it is, but we want to check it out anyway. Why don't you quit worrying and go to sleep. Photo S - Mission Control during the Apollo 13 crisis.

Deke Slayton on the right, looking at the other men. How many more of those - Are we hot mike? You had 15? I mixed up seven more. So we got By the way, there's still some water that's - it's not enough pressure to mix up another drink, but there is some water out of there, if you want to get some water out of the drink cup. Cough [Long pause. They have a lasting concern that the oxygen being drained to get the water out of the Command Module tank will limit their oxygen supply usable for the Earth landing.

If we assume that the 22 water bags are 8 ounces each, as mentioned before, this makes about 5. LM cabin, looking aft. Joking or not, Jack is not wrong. He also makes a reference to the barrel-like shape of the Ascent Engine cover, which served as his station during the times all three crewmembers were in Aquarius. The comment about the DPS burn was heard on the air to ground loop by reporters, who later asked Flight Director Gene Kranz about it during his post-shift press conference.

Kranz claimed that since the burn had been computed with two crewmen in the LM and one in the CM, the Descent Engine gimbals had to compensate for the change in the two spacecraft's center of gravity due to Swigert's presence, to a degree that it was noticeable in the burn telemetry.

Upon being asked to speculate why Swigert joined his two crewmates in the LM for the burn, Kranz suggested that "I think the third man just wanted to see what was going on. Is there any coming out still? They didn't answer. I think we made it. How's this working out? How are we going to get an alignment? It sounds like Jack is wondering about the plan for the Earth re-entry using the Command Module Computer for guidance control.

He is wondering how they can get the CM's guidance platform set up properly. We've gotta watch that one right there. It'll - it'll - It's cold. I noticed that in the Command Module.

It'll wobble. Are you planned to set up here very shortly - a powerdown procedure? Contingency Power 6. Get the book over here. And when you get to Power 6, you ought to see a circuit breaker page, panel Let's see it - thank you. On Power 6, panel 11 - The top three rows, configure them as you see them. Do you want those out, now? Jim, Pull them out. TCAs open. I'm changing those to - back again.

First three rows. They are removing power from the RCS jet quads as well as the control electronics. Are you ready for the fourth row? Therefore, we will not be able to advise you on which antenna to select for communications.

The way we want you to handle that is to turn the LM Uplink Squelch off, and when you hear the noise, switch antennas. We'll be able to see you switch antennas, and it's going to take us about 3 to 5 minutes to establish a lockon again after you switch. After each time that you switch antennas, we will initiate a voice check. And basically when you see the Earth out the window, you can be on Forward antenna, and when the Moon's up in the window use the Aft antenna. You copy?

Therefore, you won't tell us how to switch antennas and we'll enable the - I will turn the - up the Squelch Off so that when we start getting any static, we'll switch antennas and as a thumb rule we could use - with the Earth forward, we use the Forward antenna and when we see the Moon we use the Aft antenna. IMU Operate breaker supplies power into the inertial platform.

Once they remove that power they will lose their carefully preserved gimbal attitude reference. They've been using this data to determine when to ask them to switch antennas, too, but now it will be up to the crew to do the switching. In other words, we're leaving the antenna switching up to you, and after you switch antennas it's going to take 3 to 5 minutes for us to establish a lockon again, and we'll initiate a voice check.

And I'm ready to go on panel 11, row 4. Read back. This pulls the power from the RCS quad heaters. They leave the IMU heater on to preserve the platform for further use. We're going to close the Auto Transfer. And we're going to close the IMU Standby. All other breakers in that row are as you see them in the checklist. So let me confirm. We'll have one Comm system, that will be the LMP system, and we'll have to do our own antenna switching; therefore, we'll have to wait about - Okay, why don't you switch?

Aft antenna. To save a little bit of power, they will only leave one comm panel operational. You'll be working off of the LMP's panel over there. Panel 16, that's on page Power I may go over this with you, Jack, because this checklist has been written over two or three times now on our various procedures.

They have been making sure that the displays are unpowered throughout the emergency phase of the mission, and Jim doesn't want to repeat the whole list. And there's no change to the second row. Again, let me go through this with you. The first four are going to be closed. How about the CWEA? Is that going to be closed? We want the next five closed. Correction - we want all the Quad Heaters, Closed.

I have one question, Jack. On panel - on the second line there under Lighting, why are we keeping: the Floods and Track closed? Or are they going to be open? We have the, Lighting breakers all closed. Control the lighting with the switches and rheostats. We don't need the floodlights, I don't think, but we can do it that way, I guess. They plan to control the RCS temperature manually as required. Image courtesy of Frank O'Brien.

Now are we sure that this PTC mode is good enough so we don't [garble] get crossed up later and get out of configuration. We've got low bit rate TM. However, we don't have any VHF. We have CWEA. We have Glycol Pumps. We have Suit Fans. We have Cabin Repress for you, and stand by in Attitude Control here. Okay, in Attitude Control, we'll have hardovers for uses in emergency, and for normal usage we want to have a minute delay to get the heaters on to warm them up before use.

For emergency, we have the hardovers and for normal use it requires a minute request to get the heaters on. This could damage the units if the RCS quads are not at their normal operational temperatures. A minimum of 15 minutes of RCS heaters running is required. POWER-8 page of the Contingency checklist gives a rundown on the systems that remain operational during emergency powered down conditions.

Their configurations is similar to this except that the VHF radio and the onboard readouts are eliminated - the VHF due to being useless at this range, and the cabin displays since Mission Control is taking care of monitoring the systems via telemetry. I sure hate to lose the PGNS. I sure hope that procedure for the midcourse is a good one.

Lousma assures Jim that their plans for a non-computer-guided maneuver are sound. First we power down panel All of them open. After we go through this, then you can go through it again and double check it. No, I kind of don't think we need them though, do you? Give me the - first of all. We'll get back there. The LM was launched with one faulty circuit breaker that was left in the closed position, as it was needed. And we'll operate the heaters with the switches on panel 3.

They plan to keep controlling the RCS heaters with the switches instead of the power circuit breakers. And I'm closing the Heaters on panel 4, Quad 1 through 4, Off.

It's time for you guys to get to bed and get Fred up. I still think that - I still say that the - on the Lighting in our panel 16, the Flood lights and the Track should be open. We're not using them. Go ahead and open them, Track and Flood, that's all right. I guess you're keeping a handle on that? We have up to We have another cartridge and we have a procedure for making the Command Module cartridges up.

We'll pass that on later. I'm not worried about that. I just wanted to make sure that you Jim's concern is not unwarranted. A major symptom of carbon dioxide poisoning is sedation and loss of consciousness. They might fall asleep and not wake up anymore. It's now Their carbon dioxide levels are usually kept close to zero.

They are pushing the limits of safety, but are alright so far. Say, it's a spare primary cartridge back there, too, isn't it?

So that's good for another, how long? We've got another primary cartridge back there behind the ascent engine cover. He had been part of the support crew for Apollo 7 and was initially Apollo 13's backup command module pilot. He was asked to join the crew 48 hours before launch time after the original command module pilot, Ken Mattingly , was exposed to German measles.

Apollo 13 launched on April 11, The Apollo spacecraft was made up of two independent spacecraft joined by a tunnel: orbiter Odyssey, and lander Aquarius. The crew lived in Odyssey on the journey to the moon. On the evening of April 13, when the crew was nearly , kilometers , miles from Earth and closing in on the moon, mission controller Sy Liebergot saw a low-pressure warning signal on a hydrogen tank in Odyssey. The signal could have shown a problem, or could have indicated the hydrogen just needed to be resettled by heating and fanning the gas inside the tank.

That procedure was called a "cryo stir", and was supposed to stop the supercold gas from settling into layers. Related: This stunning 4K video re-creates Apollo 13's perilous trip around the moon. Swigert flipped the switch for the routine procedure.

A moment later, the entire spacecraft shook. Alarm lights lit up in Odyssey and in Mission Control as oxygen pressure fell and power disappeared. The crew notified Mission Control, with Swigert famously saying, "Houston, we've had a problem.

Much later, a NASA accident investigation board determined wires were exposed in the oxygen tank because of a combination of manufacturing and testing errors before flight. That fateful night, a spark from an exposed wire in the oxygen tank caused a fire, ripping apart one oxygen tank and damaging another inside the spacecraft.

About 2 seconds after energizing the fan circuit, a short was indicated in the current from fuel cell 3, which was supplying power to cryogenic oxygen tank 2 fans. Within several additional seconds, two other shorted conditions occurred. Electrical shorts in the fan circuit ignited the wire insulation, causing temperature and pressure to increase within cryogenic oxygen tank 2. When pressure reached the cryogenic oxygen tank 2 relief valve full-flow conditions of psi, the pressure began decreasing for about 9 seconds, at which time the relief valve probably reseated, causing the pressure to rise again momentarily.

About a quarter of a second later, a vibration disturbance was noted on the command module accelerometers. The next series of events occurred within a fraction of a second between the accelerometer disturbances and the data loss. A tank line burst, because of heat, in the vacuum jacket pressurizing the annulus and, in turn, causing the blow-out plug on the vacuum jacket to rupture.

The moon landing mission was aborted. One hour after the explosion, mission control instructed the crew to move to the LM, which had sufficient oxygen, and use it as a lifeboat. If the crew of Apollo 13 were to make it back to Earth alive, the LM would have to support three men for at least 90 hours and successfully navigate more than , miles of space. Conditions on board the LM were challenging.

The crew went on one-fifth water rations and endured cabin temperatures a few degrees above freezing to conserve energy. The square lithium hydroxide canisters from the CM were not compatible with the round openings in the LM environmental system, meaning the removal of carbon dioxide became a problem.

Mission control built an impromptu adapter out of materials known to be onboard, and the crew successfully copied their model. Navigation was also extremely complicated; the LM had a more rudimentary navigational system, and the astronauts and mission control had to work out by hand the changes in propulsion and direction needed to take the spacecraft home. On April 14, Apollo 13 swung around the moon. Swigert and Haise took pictures and Lovell talked with mission control about the most difficult maneuver, a five-minute engine burn that would give the LM enough speed to return home before its energy ran out.

The procedure was a success; Apollo 13 was on its way home. Lovell, Haise and Swigert huddled in the chilly lunar module for three long days. In these dismal conditions, Haise caught the flu. On April 17, a last-minute navigational correction was made using Earth as an alignment guide.

Then the re-pressurized CM was successfully powered up. Just before 1 p.